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Introduction
South Africa is blessed with a wealth of land and natural resources.1
† B.A., George Washington University, 2010; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2015;
Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review; Bench Editor, Cornell Moot Court Board. I would
like to thank Professor Muna B. Ndulo for his mentorship, teaching me the importance
and potential of a constitution, and for his guidance during the drafting of this piece.
Thank you to Sue Pado and the members of the Cornell International Law Journal whose
hard work and thoughtful suggestions have benefited this Note. I would also like to
honor my grandfather, Alfred R. Belinkie, whose excellence as an attorney inspired my
legal career. Finally, thank you to my dad, my mom, my sisters, and Damien Rose for
their love and support; everything I have accomplished so far has been the result of your
encouragement.
1. See Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 2
para. 1 available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2013/9.html (“South Africa is
48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 219 (2015)
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However, as a result of South Africa’s previous apartheid government,
approximately 13% of the population controls 87% of the country’s land
and minerals.2 Despite this present-day inequality, the rise of democracy
in 1994 engendered a new South Africa.3 This rebirth led to the creation
of a new constitution aimed at rectifying South Africa’s history of landgrabbing and race-based politics through the redistribution of the country’s land to its rightful owners.4
The new South African Constitution specifically promotes “an open
and democratic society” with the economic goals of “improv[ing] the quality of life of each person and free[ing] the potential of each person.”5 The
South African Constitutional Committee determined that improving each
individual’s quality of life was directly tied to providing equal access to
land, natural resources, land reform, and adequate housing.6 Therefore
those rights, among others, are expressly granted in the South African
Constitution.7
Nevertheless, tension arises from the realities of land ownership in
post-apartheid South Africa.8 Economic power from land ownership is
not only a beauty to behold but also a geographically sizeable country and very rich in
minerals”).
2. The Land and Agrarian Reform Project (LARP), The Concept Document 6 (Feb.
2008) available at http://www.nda.agric.za/doaDev/topMenu/DoAProgrammes/
LARP_25Feb08.pdf [hereinafter LARP] (identifying land distribution as a priority in
light of “the new democratic Government of South Africa inherit[ing] a racially highly
skewed land distribution: whites owned 87 and blacks 13 percent of agricultural land.”).
See also Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 2
para. 1 (“the architecture of the apartheid system placed about 87 percent of the land
and the mineral resources that lie in its belly in the hands of 13 percent of the population”); Edward Lahiff, Documentaries with a point of view: Promised Land, Q&A: Land
Reform in South Africa, PBS (July 6, 2010) available at http://www.pbs.org/pov/promisedland/land_reform.php (“In 1994, at the end of apartheid, almost 90 percent of the
land in South Africa was owned by white South Africans, who make up less than 10
percent of the population. . . . [l]ess than 7 percent of land has been redistributed to
date”).
3. See Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 2
para. 1 (“To address th[ese] gross economic inequality[ies], legislative measures were
taken to facilitate equitable access to opportunities in the mining industry”).
4. See Bernadette Atuahene, South Africa’s Land Reform Crisis: Eliminating the Legacy of Apartheid, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July/Aug. 2011) available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67905/bernadette-atuahene/south-africas-land-reform-crisis
(identifying the African National Congress’s (ANC) goal of “redistributing 30 percent of
the land from whites to blacks in the first five years of the new democracy” after Mandela
took power in 1994).
5. S. AFR. CONST., Preamble (1996).
6. See S. AFR. CONST. (1996), §§ 25, 26, 27, 29.
7. See id. The constitution provides additional rights including, access to health
care, sufficient food and water, social security, and education.
8. See Palash Ghosh, South Africa’s White Farmers: An Endangered Species?, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Dec. 3, 2012, 1:06 PM) available at http://www.ibtimes.com/
south-africas-white-farmers-endangered-species-915345 (discussing the hundreds of
murders and attacks on white South African farmers and the lack of response their
farming associations are likely to receive from the government); see also Frans Cronje,
How much of SA’s land is really in black hands?, POLITICS WEB (Feb. 27, 2012) available at
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619/page71639
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divided almost cleanly along racial lines, creating racial tension between
black and white South Africans due to the economic inequalities. These
economic inequalities derive from the apartheid government’s systematic
transfer of land from black South Africans to white South Africans over the
course of a century.9 Today, despite innovative land reform programs, the
current government has had limited success returning or redistributing
land.10 As a result, land ownership continues to be an emotional and
highly charged issue with whites maintaining ownership over the vast
majority of the country’s land. Professor Atuahene cites James Gibson’s
survey of South African public opinion and argues,
South Africa’s failure to rectify its land inequality is like a sea of oil waiting
for a match. In one of the most impressive public opinion studies ever conducted in the country, in 2009 the political scientist James Gibson surveyed
3,700 South Africans and found that 85 percent of black respondents
believed that ‘most land in South Africa was taken unfairly by white settlers,
and they therefore have no right to the land today.’ Only eight percent of
white respondents held the same view. Gibson’s most alarming finding was
that two of every three of these blacks agreed that ‘land must be returned to
blacks in South Africa, no matter what the consequences are for the current
owners and for political stability in the country’; 91 percent of the whites
surveyed disagreed.11

While the land-restitution programs initially experienced success, the
government’s progress has plateaued.12 Scholars and critics have predicted that if the situation is not improved, South Africa might end up in a
violent revolt similar to the one experienced in neighboring Zimbabwe.13
?oid=282525&sn=Detail&pid=71639 (“Any discussion on land ownership in South
Africa risks generating more heat than light”).
9. See THE CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ENTERPRISE, POLICY IN THE MAKING: LAND
REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA: A 21ST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 5– 7 (June 2005). During the
apartheid era, the Native Land Act of 1913, the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act, and
the Group Areas Act of 1950 continued to transfer land ownership from black to white
South Africans. Today, whites own over 80% of the land in South Africa, with the majority of the remaining 20% set aside by the government for tribal homelands.
10. See Atuahene, supra note 4. Only 8% of South African land has been redistributed since the fall of apartheid, despite extensive government initiatives designed to
accomplish that objective.
11. See Atuahene, supra note 4.
12. See id. The land restitution process experienced more success in urban settings,
where victims could be paid damages with money rather than land, than rural settings.
See also LARP, supra note 2 (identifying the previous land reform policies as slow and of
questionable success, in the context of a government document).
13. See Alanna Chang, South Africa: The Up Down, An Application of A Downstream
Model to Enforce Positive Socio-Economic Rights, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 621, 637 (2007)
(“In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court prefaced its decision by alluding to South
Africa’s potential for a Zimbabwe-like land grab”). See e.g. Pumza Fihlani, Can South
Africa avoid doing a Zimbabwe on land?, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2013, 11:25) available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22967906 (“In the face of the lack of progress,
some activists are calling for a more drastic approach, including taking land from white
farmers without compensation . . . But many look at Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown
after it seized most of the country’s white-owned commercial farms and caution against
this approach”); Robin Palmer, Land Policy Adviser, The World Bank, Civil Society, and
Land Reform, OXFAM GB (Aug. 2000) available at www.mokoro.co.uk/files/13/file/lria/
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The apartheid regime caused similar tensions in South Africa’s mining
industry, through polices that resulted in race-based dispossession of mineral rights.14 While transferring land rights, white colonists simultaneously took ownership over the country’s mineral rights through legislation
designed to create colonial wealth.15 Until the 1990s, whites maintained
almost complete title to the country’s mineral and mining rights with minimal limits on the way those rights could be exercised.16 Through postapartheid government regulation and industry-wide reforms, the past
twenty years have seen the mining industry evolve in positive ways. The
main change has come from partial nationalization of the mining industry
and a revocation of the colonial mining legislation. This has enabled the
government to implement a system that meets the goals of efficiency, mineral conservation, and equal access to mineral resources.17
South Africa’s successful reform of the mineral ownership program
serves as a model to other African countries that are struggling with foreign possession of domestic resources.18 Given Africa’s history of colonization, many countries currently find themselves struggling with foreign
wb_civil_society_land_reform.pdf (“As for the “new” and much-hyped model of “marketassisted” land reforms, which involve governments taking a more hands-off approach,
they have conspicuously failed to address either political realities or power relations on
the ground. In Brazil they have done nothing to break the power of the large landlords,
while in post-apartheid South Africa their scope for securing sustainable rural livelihoods for poor people has proved to be extremely limited”).
14. See Laissez-Fair, Mining in South Africa and Private Enterprise, 3 S. AFR. J. ON
HUM. RTS. 167, 172 (1987). Franz Wild and Mike Cohen, Mandela’s Wealth-Sharing
Dream Fades in South Africa, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2013) available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-07-22/mandela-s-wealth-sharing-dream-fades-in-south-africa
.html (explaining a conflict between villagers in Modikwa and African Rainbow Minerals
Ltd. (ARI) mining company over the Modikwa platinum mine in Limpopo province. The
founders of the mine promised to develop schools, hospitals, and homes, in return for a
lucrative mining operation. Today 80,000 villagers have seen no benefit from the mine
while ARI remains highly lucrative).
15. See F.T. Cawood and R.C.A. Minnitt, A historical perspective on the economics of
the ownership of mineral rights ownership, THE JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE
OF MINING AND METALLURGY 369, 370 (1998) (referring to the Native Land Act 27 of
1913). Today whites occupy 73% of the top business management positions. See COMMISSION FOR EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ANNUAL REPORT 2012-13, DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (Apr. 2013) available at http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/
downloads/documents/annual-reports/employment-equity/commission-for-employment-equity-annual-report-2012-2013/cee13report.pdf/view.
16. See DEPARTMENT OF MINERALS AND ENERGY, A MINERALS AND MINING POLICY FOR
SOUTH AFRICA, 1.3.1.2 Ownership of Mineral Rights (Oct. 1998) available at http://www
.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/white_papers/minerals98.html (explaining that South
Africa’s mineral rights used to be 1/3 state-owned and 2/3s privately owned, while “[a]
distinguishing feature of the South African mining industry at present is that almost all
privately-owned mineral rights are in white hands”).
17. See ANC POLICY INSTITUTE, MAXIMIZING THE DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF THE PEOPLE’S MINERAL ASSETS: STATE INTERVENTION IN THE MINERALS SECTOR 1, 2 (Feb. 2012) available at www.anc.org.za/docs/reps/2012/simsreport.pdf (discussing the nationalization
of South Africa’s mines as a pathway toward “effectively maximis[ing] the growth, development and employment potential embedded in such national [mineral] assets, and not
purely for profit maximization”).
18. See Cawood & Minnitt, supra note 15, at 370.
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control of their oil and mineral wealth.19 In the past twenty years, South
Africa and a few other African countries20 have corrected this inequality by
implementing land and mineral licensing programs.21 These programs
have allowed mining companies to continue business operations while giving the African governments control over the quantity of minerals
extracted, the duration of mining licenses, the parties participating in mining processes, and the benefits local communities receive from the
operations.22
The purpose of this Note is to propose a method for South Africa to
mirror its domestic mineral reform success in its land reform programs.
South Africa is opportunely situated to accomplish this objective because it
has the most liberal constitution in the world.23 This constitution creates a
legal framework for progressive land and resource redistribution.24 If
South Africa creates a successful land distribution scheme, this system
could serve as an example for numerous other African countries experiencing similar struggles. Even in the absence of a rights-based constitution,
other African countries could adapt South Africa’s model of progressive
taxation as a solution to land reform.
Part I of this Note introduces background on the issue and examines
South Africa’s history and present legal framework, which has paved the
way for progressive land reform. Part II analyzes the success and future
potential of South Africa’s current land restitution policies. Part III examines the history of South Africa’s mining policies, describes how the current progressive taxation system successfully accomplishes the country’s
mining goals, and addresses the interests of all parties involved. Part IV
describes how South Africa can utilize its mining regulatory framework to
meet its land distribution goals. This Note concludes that the advances
South Africa has made in its mining policy can successfully be applied to
its land distribution program. The improved land distribution program
19. See S. Afr. Trade and Indus. Minister Rob Davies, New Approach Needed on
Investment Treaties, Presentation at United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, (Sept. 24, 2012) available at http://www.igd.org.za/archives/latest-stories/1597-south-african-minister-new-approach-needed-on-investment-treaties
(recognizing “that while [foreign direct investment] can make a positive contribution to
sustainable development, the benefits to host countries are not automatic.”).
20. See ANC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 17, at 2.
21. Seeid.; see also Mike Cohen, South Africa Wants Black Ownership of Mines Maintained at 26%, BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2014, 12:16 PM) available at http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2014-07-15/south-africa-wants-black-ownership-of-mines-maintained-at-26.html (citing comments of South Africa’s Mineral Resources Minister Ngoako
Ramatlhodi stating that “mining companies should maintain 26 percent black ownership of their assets in the country or risk losing their operating licenses”).
22. See Towards the transfer of Mineral wealth to the ownership of the people as a whole:
A Perspective on Nationalisation of Mines, ANC YOUTH LEAGUE (Aug. 2010) available at
http://www.ancyl.org.za/show.php?id=5502 (discussing the foreseeable benefits of
South Africa’s mineral nationalization policy); see also David van Wyk, Debate on
Nationalising the Mines in South Africa, IN DEFENCE OF MARXISM (Feb. 6, 2010) available at
http://www.marxist.com/south-africa-mines-nationalisation-debate.htm.
23. See Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy, 1 (4) SA 1 (CC) (2013).
24. See id.
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will not only provide an efficient, market-driven redistribution of property
but will also set a model for other African countries to follow.25
I.

Background

A.

South Africa’s History and Present Legal Framework

1.

Statutory Framework from Colonialism and Apartheid

The African continent has an extensive history of colonization. During the colonial period, invading countries often stripped native Africans of
land and maintained ownership of this land by force.26 South Africa, however, is a poignant example because its history of “property dispossession
has greatly contributed to present-day inequality and has become a politically explosive issue that can cause backlash.”27
Pre-colonial South Africans utilized collective systems of land rights,
which prioritized communal land uses and community interests.28 Individuals, who pledged allegiance to the community, were allowed to maintain individual land allotments to foster land that they inhabited or
cultivated.29 Those individual allotments, based on usage, were inheritable
in perpetuity.30 The head of the family regulated land usage, and tribal
chiefs consulted both elders and those individuals living and using the
land before making any decisions that could affect property rights.31
Under this communal system, land was distributed based on need, land
use, and individual status.32
The arrival of Dutch colonists in 1652 marked the formation of a new
land ownership system.33 The new system required formal registration of
property, did not acknowledge communal land systems, and effectively
excluded blacks from property ownership.34 This trend of land dispossession (outside of those blacks who were “grandfathered” into ownership)
continued until The Native Land Act of 1913 (the “Native Land Act”). The
Native Land Act officially deprived black South Africans of the ability to
25. See Section IV.C infra.
26. See Bernadette Atuahene, Property Rights & the Demands of Transformation, 31
MICH. J. INT’L L. 765, 767 (2010); see also NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH
AFRICA: CONQUEST, APARTHEID, DEMOCRACY 6– 37 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the history of
land dispossession in South Africa).
27. Id. See also Bernadette Atuahene, Things Fall Apart: The Illegitimacy of Property
Rights in the Context of Past Property Theft, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 849 & n. 87 (2009)
(discussing how opposing views of property ownership can be detrimental to future
political progress in post-colonial societies).
28. See e.g., Chang, supra note 13.
29. See Durkje Gilfillan, Poverty Alleviation, Economic Advancement and the need
for Tenure Reform in Rural Areas, 1– 2, Address at the SAPRN Conference on Land
Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Southern Africa, Pretoria (June 4, 2001), available at
http://www.sarpn.org.za/EventPapers/Land/20010605Gilfillan.pdf.
30. See id. at 1.
31. See id. at 2.
32. See Atuahene, supra note 27, at 779– 83.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 784.
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own land.35 Blacks who were previous landowners became tenants, and
the land ownership of tribal officials became uncertain.36
In 1936, the Native Trust and Land Act dramatically increased segregation by officially designating certain areas of land as available only to
whites.37 Simultaneously, the Native Trust and Land Act impeded the sustainability of black communities by re-designating black homelands to
remote rural areas with few natural resources.38 The Group Areas Act of
1950 exacerbated these problems by limiting the access of black individuals to specific urban areas.39 The practical effect of the Group Areas Act
was to prevent blacks from living or working in cities and urban areas in
South Africa.40 Blacks were restricted to various “homelands,” rural locations without white South Africans, which were established throughout the
country.41
At the height of these regulations came the Prevention of Illegal Squatters Act of 1951, which forced the relocation of blacks who were squatting
on white public or private property.42 The Illegal Squatters Act also
applied to black individuals who were renting land on white property, even
allowing white property owners to demolish the renters’ homes.43 These
black renters were then required to move into squatter villages.44 Lastly,
legislators passed Section 10 of the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 to
limit the movement of blacks into urban areas.45 Section 10 codified
restrictive pre-apartheid practices by limiting the number of blacks allowed
to live in urban areas only to those who were one of the following: (1) born
in an urban area, (2) employed in an urban area for over 15 years, or (3)
35. See e.g., T.R.H. DAVENPORT & CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS, SOUTH AFRICA: A MODERN
HISTORY 271, 390 (2000). See also ROBERT C. COTTRELL, SOUTH AFRICA: A STATE OF
APARTHEID (ARBITRARY BORDERS) 83 (2005) (noting that blacks made up over 70% of the
population but lived on only 7% of the land).
36. See ANTON D. LOWENBERG & WILLIAM H. KAEMPFER, THE ORIGINS AND DEMISE OF
SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID: A PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS 34 (1998); see also BERTUS DE VILLIERS, LAND REFORM: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF EXPERIENCES IN
ZIMBABWE, NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND AUSTRALIA 46 (2003); Gilfillan, supra note 29, at 2
(“Racial discrimination restricted the extent of land Blacks were allowed to own. . . . As a
result chiefs and traditional authorities gained title in land to which they had no legitimate claim, neither at common law nor at customary law”).
37. See e.g., Chang, supra note 13, at 627 (explaining the development of
“homelands”).
38. Id.
39. Id. See also Thami Ka Plaatjie, Taking Matters Into Their Own Hands: The Indigenous African Response to the Land Crisis in South Africa, in UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE
LAND CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 287, 291– 92 (Margaret C. Lee & Karen Colvard eds.,
2003).
40. The Group Areas Act deprived blacks of adequate opportunities for housing and
forced many to commute long distances for work. See Helen Suzman, Key Legislation in
the Formation of Apartheid (March 16, 2009) available at http://www.cortland.edu/cgis/
suzman/apartheid.html.
41. Id.
42. Chang, supra note 13, at 629.
43. See DAVENPORT & SAUNDERS, supra note 35, at 390.
44. See id.
45. See Chang, supra note 13, at 629; see also DAVENPORT & SAUNDERS, supra note
355, at 390.
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employed by the same urban employer for at least 10 years.46 The Native
Laws Amendment Act severely restricted the ability of black South Africans
to find employment.
Today, approximately 32% of South Africans still live in the homelands.47 In addition to living in re-designated homelands, problems with
land invasion, squatting, urbanization, and severe black unemployment
can also be traced back to these apartheid-era statutes.48
2.

South Africa’s Democratic Constitution

In the early 1990s, South Africa faced pressure from the United
Nations to end apartheid.49 An international, multi-racial movement
began toward a united South Africa. The first legislative progress was the
Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act of 1991, which repealed the
1913 and 1936 Land Acts, thus reinstating in Blacks the right to own
land.50 In 1994, Nelson Mandela became President of the new democracy
and the South African Interim Constitution was drafted and put into
effect.51 Scholars have since characterized South Africa’s Constitution as
“the most admirable constitution in the history of the world.”52
The Constitutional framework was designed to reinstate the fundamental rights of black South Africans.53 One of the most significant
aspects of the new Constitution is the granting of property rights and housing rights to all citizens.54 Specifically, Sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution create a right to adequate housing and declare that the government
must use reasonable means to foster equitable access to land.55 The statute’s language, however, limits the government’s responsibility to provide
land and housing with the term “available resources.”56 This language provides South African citizens with a justiciable right without imposing
expansive duties on the government.57 This language also allows the legislature and government to work toward achieving these rights over an unde46. Chang, supra note 13, at 629.
47. Id.
48. See Chang, supra note 13, at 629 (citing Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom
(2001) (1) SA 46 (CC) at 54 (S. Afr.)).
49. See Plaatjie, supra note 39, at 291– 92.
50. See Villiers, supra note 36, at 47.
51. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993.
52. See Chang, supra note 13, at 621. South Africa finalized its current constitution
in 1996.
53. See generally S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993 (including provisions designed to
protect formal democratic equality, as well as substantive rights that would ensure equal
freedoms among the people of South Africa.
54. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§ 25– 27 (explaining South Africa’s approach to
human rights in the shadow of an apartheid government).
55. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§ 25– 26; see also Chang, supra note 13, at 623.
56. See S. Afr. Const. 1996, §26(2) (determining that South Africa would be able to
achieve progressive realization by taking reasonable measures within its available
resources); see also Paul Nolette, Lessons Learned from the South African Constitutional
Court: Towards a Third Way of Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 12 MICH. ST.
J. INT’L L. 91, 99– 100 (2003).
57. See Chang, supra note 13, at 661 (citing S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §25).
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fined period of time, while still granting the rights that allow South African
citizens to legally challenge abuses.58
B.

Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom

South Africa’s Constitutional Court addressed the scope of the government’s responsibility to ensure constitutional rights and to provide housing
in Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom.59 In a class action suit, the government charged Irene Grootbloom and 900 other citizens (“Respondents”) with illegally occupying private government land.60 The
Respondents had relocated there from another squatter settlement, which
lacked water, sewage, and electricity.61 Some of the Respondents had been
on housing wait lists for over seven years.62 Upon moving to the government property, the group built shelters and called the new settlement “New
Rust.”63 Within a few months, the municipality evicted the squatters and
bulldozed their homes.64 The Respondents then found refuge at a sports
complex, where they built makeshift shelters but were still exposed to the
elements.65
While determining that the municipality did not take adequate measures to provide the Respondents with access to housing, the Constitutional Court established a reasonableness standard for assessing
government-housing responsibilities.66 Under that standard, the State is
obliged “to take reasonable legislative and other measures to ensure the
progressive realization of this right within its available resources.”67 Using
the standard, the Constitutional Court concluded that although there was a
“massive shortage in available housing and an extremely constrained
budget[,]” the State failed to provide adequate housing and was prevented
from using that failure as an excuse to eliminate shelters which were
actively being used.68 Even considering the financial constraints on the
municipality, the Court found that the State action in Grootbloom failed the
reasonableness test.69
The Constitutional Court required that the reasonableness test be universally applicable and respond to an array of housing needs.70 This
58. Chang, supra note 13, at 661.
59. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC)
at 53 (S. Afr.).
60. Id. at 53. The other respondents consisted of 510 children and 390 adults. Furthermore, the land illegally occupied was ironically earmarked for low-income housing.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 55.
65. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC)
at 9– 10 (S. Afr.).
66. See id. at 11.
67. Id.
68. Id. This avoided hindering government action with burdensome housing funding requirements.
69. See id. at 25– 26.
70. See id. at 68.
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meant a government program could not preclude segments of the population, and the program must respond to the short-term, intermediate, and
long-term housing needs of the populations at issue.71 In Grootbloom, the
municipality at issue was making an effort to construct long-term housing
but its actions were found unconstitutional because the program violated
the respondents’ short-term housing needs.72
The Court rejected the government’s argument that requiring a balance of needs would result in the diversion of resources ordinarily used for
long-term housing to short-term housing, which would make constructing
housing developments impossible.73 The Court also rejected the argument
that if the government could not remove squatters, the government would
lose the ability to develop designated properties, and the Court reiterated
the State’s duty to provide shelter.74 The Court limited the government’s
responsibility to provide shelter, to constraining government action that
destroys housing for which there is an immediate need.75
In the context of land reform, the Grootbloom decision means that the
government has a responsibility to strive to meet the rights threshold set by
the Constitution. Although this requirement does not burden the government with providing more housing than is needed, the government is prevented from making decisions that will neglect immediate housing needs
in favor of a long-term strategy.
C.

President of South Africa v. Modderklip Boerdery, Ltd.

Implementation of the Constitution faces further issues because not
all of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution comport with the ideals
of all South Africans.76 White South Africans have argued that many of the
individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution have been implemented
71. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC)
at 68 (S. Afr.).
72. See id. at 53.
73. See id. at 36– 37 (emphasizing the balance between goals and means). Government measures must be effective and timely, but the availability of resources is an important consideration.
74. See id.; see also Marie Huchzermeyer, Housing Rights in South Africa: Invasions,
Evictions, the Media, and the Courts in the Cases of Grootboom, Alexandra, and Bredell, 14
URB. F. 80, 87– 88 (2003).
75. See Marius Olivier, Constitutional Perspectives on the Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights: Recent South African Experiences, 33 VICT. UNIV. OF WELLINGTON L. REV.
117, 137 (2003) (“In Grootboom the Constitutional Court remarked, within the context
of the right to access to adequate housing, that there is, at the very least, a negative
obligation placed upon the State and all other entities and persons to desist from
preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate housing”). This limitation curtails the government’s obligation to provide housing, but it also lessens the constitutional rights. For example, Grootbloom was handed down October 4, 2000 and the
municipality did not create new housing plans until 2002. Eventually Grootbloom had
to find housing elsewhere.
76. Section Nine of the South African Constitution states that “[t]o promote the
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be
taken.” This clause has caused racial strife between South Africans who support the
government’s use of affirmative action to remedy past violations, and those who do not.
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purely for the benefit of the black population, at the expense of the white
South Africans.77 This tension is best exemplified at the state level, where
adequate financial commitment to provide services is often lacking.78
Modderklip demonstrates the difficulties of forcing municipalities to
obey court orders, regardless of the Constitution.79 In Modderklip, a
municipality evicted 400 homeless black individuals from an informal settlement.80 That group then illegally occupied land held by Modderklip
Boerdery, Ltd.81 The municipality notified Modderklip of the illegal occupation and ordered the company to evict the squatters.82 Modderklip
refused to evict the squatters because it believed the eviction was the city’s
responsibility.83 Instead, Modderklip brought trespass charges against the
squatters; however, the police requested the company refrain from filing
criminal charges due to inadequate prison capacity.84 Modderklip then
offered to sell the property to the city for 10,000 rand, but the city rejected
the offer.85 As a result of the delay, 18,000 squatters occupied the property in October 2000, growing to almost 40,000 by April 2001.86
The Constitutional Court held for Modderklip and affirmed damages
for both the lost use of the property and the state’s gain in avoiding the
need to provide the squatters alternative land.87 Importantly, the Court
acknowledged that damages were not an optimal form of relief.88 The
Court explained that the State should have expropriated the property for
the squatter’s use, especially since Modderklip offered to sell the property.89 This would have allowed the inhabitation to be legal, and the State
would have avoided the problem of having to find a substitute property for
the squatters.90 The Court, however, acknowledged its inability to force
expropriation without violating the separation of powers.91
In Modderklip, the need for the judicial branch to avoid determining
how the State would meet its constitutional responsibilities outweighed
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §9. See also supra note 11 (commenting on the racial divide in
opinions regarding land restitution policies).
77. See Atuahene, supra note 4 (referring to the affirmative action provisions in the
constitution, which were designed to benefit black South Africans in order to remedy the
effects of the apartheid regime).
78. See Chang, supra note 13, at 622– 23.
79. See President of S. Afr. v. Modderklip Boerdery, Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) at 9 (S.
Afr.).
80. Id. at 3– 4.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 4– 5. This order complied with § 6(4) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.
83. See id. at 5– 6.
84. See id. at 4.
85. See President of S. Afr. v. Modderklip Boerdery, Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) at 10– 11
(S. Afr.).
86. See id. at 5– 6.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 13– 14.
89. See id. at 28– 29.
90. See President of S. Afr. v. Modderklip Boerdery, Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) at 28– 29
(S. Afr.).
91. See id. at 33– 35.
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efficient distribution.92 The Court also discussed the State’s responsibility
in ensuring the maintenance of law and order.93 While the municipalities
at issue in this situation failed to purchase the land for the squatters, the
Court cautioned against making the same decision in the future. Without
State enforcement of individual rights, citizens could be pushed into taking
the law into their own hands.94 Local governments must thus implement
socio-economic rights and land reform programs in order to avoid a
Zimbabwe-like situation.95
II. South Africa’s Land Reform Policies
Many politicians and activists call for land reform as the mechanism
to rectify the inequality still prevalent in South Africa.96 Implicit in popular land reform is a push to redistribute land predominantly owned by
white farmers in a manner that would facilitate the creation of a large,
black farming class.97 Many argue that South Africa’s long-term economic
security depends on both continuous agricultural development and sustainable economic activity for the native populations.98 The reality today,
however, is that most South Africans live or are migrating to urban areas of
the country.99 This creates a more pressing need for urban employment
and housing opportunities, as opposed to plots of land to farm.100 While
the government struggles with securing sufficient funds to finance both the
redistribution of land and development of urban infrastructure for migration,101 the country continues to face massive problems of homelessness,
landlessness, and inadequate resources for the poorest South Africans.102
92. See id. at 28– 30.
93. See id. at 9– 11.
94. See id. at 26.
95. See id. (“Otherwise the purpose of the rule of law would be subverted by the very
execution process that ought to uphold it”).
96. See e.g., Atuahene, supra note 4 (“According to South African President Jacob
Zuma, land reform ranks at the top of the ANC’s agenda”).
97. See Policy in the Making, supra note 9, at 10.
98. See Land and Power: The growing scandal surrounding the new wave of investments
in land, RELIEF WEB (Sept. 22, 2011) available at http://reliefweb.int/report/world/landand-power-growing-scandal-surrounding-new-wave-investments-land. The World Bank
has recognized the importance of land tenure in the context of Africa’s agricultural
development.
99. See Policy in the Making, supra note 9, at 10.
100. See e.g., Land Reform in South Africa: Getting back on track, CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ENTERPRISE, RESEARCH NO 16, Executive Summary 3 (May 2008) available at
www.urbanlandmark.org.za/downloads/LandReform_South_Africa.pdf [hereinafter
CDE] (explaining South Africa’s urbanization and “land reform programmes must
include the identification and release of urban and peri-urban land for settlement, housing and job creation, as well as reform of ownership and use of land suitable for
farming”).
101. See Atuahene, supra note 4 (noting that South Africa’s Land Restitution Commission, the agency responsible for the land reform efforts, placed a moratorium on land
restitution in 2010. This was a result of underfunding from the government, which
caused the agency to back out of numerous land-purchase agreements).
102. See Chang, supra note 13, at 667 (concluding that the transfer of land has the
potential to “raise the standard of living for much of the population” but the government
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Hence, land redistribution efforts, which are dependent on adequate funding, have stagnated.103
Land reform is critical to South Africa’s stability, economic development, and recovery post-apartheid.104 In 1994, the government established a land reform program geared toward accomplishing these goals by
implementing the Constitution’s open-ended property clause.105 Three different program components address post-apartheid land inequities— land
restitution, land tenure reform, and land redistribution. Land restitution
restores land to blacks whose property was taken under apartheid legislation.106 Land tenure reform coveys ownership rights to blacks, who have
worked and lived on farms for years without secured rights.107 Land redistribution involves tailoring policy to create more black landowners.108
A.

Land Restitution

Since the Native Land Act of 1913, black South Africans have been
deprived of legitimate land ownership in a variety of ways.109 Under the
land restitution initiative, blacks are given back the property that was taken
away from them under apartheid legislation, with the goal of righting previous wrongs and promoting equality and land ownership between the
races.110 Restitution applies to both rural and urban land claims.111 The
Restitution Act created a committee to investigate land claims and a court
to settle claims between parties.112
Restitution has by far been the most successful of the three reform
methods.113 In 2006, the Land Claims Commission declared that 89% of
still needs to focus on “urbanization, public transportation, and high unemployment
rates”).
103. See e.g., Amy Ochoa Carson, East Timor’s Land Tenure Problems: A Consideration
of Land Reform Programs in South Africa and Zimbabwe, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
395, 414 (2007) (explaining South Africa’s “The land tenure program did not prove to be
as successful as the government had hoped; a mere forty-one out of 63,000 claims were
settled [by 2005]”).
104. See Atuahene, supra note 4 (“South Africa’s failure to rectify its land inequality is
like a sea of oil waiting for a match”).
105. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§ 25, 26 (granting all individuals the right to own
property); see e.g., Hasani Claxton, Land and Liberation: Lessons for the Creation of Effective Land Reform Policy in South Africa, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 529, 546 (2003) (“The
South African Department of Land Affairs (DLA), headed by Derek Hanekon, was created in 1994 to deal with land distribution issues”).
106. See Claxton, supra note 108, at 546.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 547.
109. See Bernadette Atuahene, From Reparation to Restoration: Moving Beyond Restoring Property Rights to Restoring Political and Economic Visibility, 60 SMU L. REV. 1419,
1457 (2007) (noting that dispossession of black land began before 1913 however “the
1913 law was the first major piece of legislation that allowed the newly formed South
African state to legally dispossess Blacks of their land”).
110. See id. The land restitution initiative was implemented in 1994 with the Restitution of Land Rights Act, no. 22.
111. See Chang, supra note 13, at 633.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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the claims it received had been settled.114 Land restitution involves the
adjudication of claims, with the party entitled to damages having the
option of either land or monetary compensation.115 The South African
government would acquire white-owned land based on market rates and
then redistribute the land based on the Land Claim Court decisions.116
After determining the “willing buyer, willing seller” model was taking too
long and proving to be ineffective,117 the government shortened the legal
negotiation period to six months and reserved the right to expropriate the
land if negotiations proved to be unsuccessful.118
Despite the program’s initial success and future potential, the program
never fulfilled the goal it was set to accomplish. While 89% of claims were
settled, those claims were settled via payouts as opposed to land. Blacks
who would have preferred to receive land instead of monetary compensation were out of luck because white landowners were reluctant to actually
sell their land.119 Alternatively, white landowners would selectively identify parcels to sell and then receive market rate for the worst sections of the
land they owned.120 In the context of a shortage of farmable land to distribute, urban land reform proved dramatically more successful.121 The
114. See id.; see also See KwaZulu-Natal, Land claims settlements near 90%, says
Gwanya Edward West, BUS. DAY (July 5, 2006, 2:00) available at http://www.eprop.co.za/
commercial-property-news/item/7119-Land-claims-settlements-near-90-says-GwanyaEdward-West.html (“The Land Claims Commission says it has settled 89% of the claims
lodged with it, while the remaining 11% are expected to be completed by 2008”).
115. Ruth Hall, A Comparative Analysis of Land Reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe,
in UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE LAND CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 264 (2003) (Margaret C.
Lee & Karen Colvard eds., 2003).
116. See id.
117. See Review on Land Acquisition and Willing Buyer Willing Seller Principle: briefing by Department of Rural Development and Land Reform; Committee Report on joint
oversight visits to the Northern Cape, Limpopo, Free State and Mpumalanga (May 23,
2012) available at http://www.pmg.org.za/print/report/20120523-department-ruraldevelopment-and-land-reform-findings-study-commissio (quoting Mr. S. Ntapane, a
leader of the United Democratic Movement (the ANC’s opposition party), stating that
“[t]he pace of land redistribution was slow and ineffective. The figure quoted in the
report for redistributed land already allocated was too little, why? The Department had
been using the willing-buyer willing-seller approach, it had to be agreed that this was not
working. Nation building and social cohesion could not be a talking point when the
majority of the people in this country were landless. There was a need for commitment
and flexibility from all the stakeholders”).
118. See Farmers spooked by ‘expropriation’ threat, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. (Sept. 2006),
available at http://worldtradereview.com/news.asp?pType=N&iType=A&iID=139&siD=
22&nID=29192 (“Organizations representing farmers called on Agriculture and Land
Affairs Minister Lulu Xingwana to clarify remarks that farmers had six months to agree
on a selling price before their farms would be seized”); see also Justin Arenstein &
Thandee N’wa Mhangwana, Scam sparked land reform review, BUANEWS (Mar. 3, 2006),
available at http://www.lawlibrary.co.za/notice/wordsanddeeds/2006/2006_03_06
.htm#press_scamsparked (“Expropriation ‘will only be used very selectively in a very
small number of cases where negotiations have effectively stalled without any prospect
of resolution,’ said Dr Edward Lahiff, a researcher at the University of the Western
Cape’s programme for land and agrarian studies.”).
119. See Hall, supra note 115, at 262.
120. See id.
121. See CDE, supra note 100, at 4 (noting that “[t]he restitution process has successfully settled almost all urban claims”).
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increased success can be partly attributed to urban claimants being significantly more likely to consent to receiving monetary compensation, as
opposed to actual land.122 Today, the vast majority of unsettled claims
involve rural land, where an individual claim can cover hundreds of families and huge amounts of land.123
B.

Land Tenure Reform

The government designed land tenure reform to provide ownership
possibilities for black farmers who had worked or had other historical
claims to white-owned farmland.124 Individuals seeking tenure had claims
to the property based on years, sometimes going back generations, of working on commercial farms, or based on living and working on communal
homelands (both of which created no formal ownership rights).125
For individuals working on commercial farms, the Land Reform Act of
1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997 created ownership interests in the farms where they worked.126 The acts legally secured
land tenure and “allowed second-generation labor tenants to acquire the
titles to land they had used for cultivation and grazing in lieu of remuneration in cash.”127 However, in reality, these programs were most effective
for developing a formal process for labor tenants to bring legal land-related
claims and demand formal eviction procedures.128 When evictions
occurred, the government provided alternative land or housing for those
tenants.129
For individuals inhabiting communal homelands, the Communal
Property Association Act 28 of 1996 protected the collective right to land,
which had not been acknowledged under the common law land system.130
122. See Chang, supra note 13, at 633.
123. See Hall, supra note 115, at 262.
124. See Chang, supra note 13, at 634.
125. The hierarchy prioritizes ownership in this order: ownership itself, limited real
rights that restrict rights of owners, and personal rights in property. See Chang, supra
note 13, at 634. Farming commercial farms or communal homelands did not reach the
personal rights in real property level of ownership. Id.
126. See Department of Rural Development & Land Reform of the Republic of South
Africa, Strengthening the Relative Rights of People Working the Land: Policy Proposals
(July 30, 2013) [hereinafter RDLR] available at www.plaas.org.za/. . .landpdf/Strengthening%20the%20Relative%20Right. These pieces of legislation were designed to protect
the rights of commercial farmers. In 2004, an estimated six million black farmers were
evicted or displaced from commercial farms in South Africa.
127. Hall, supra note 115, at 264.
128. See Gilfillan, supra note 29, at 7 (“In reality [ ] the legislation has provided for
little else but a statutory framework for ‘fair eviction procedures’”); see also RDLR, supra
note 125, at 17 (“The highly unequal relationship between farm owners and farm workers/dwellers, in which the latter are completely dependent on the former for sustaining
livelihoods, makes it almost impossible for these vulnerable groups to fight for their
rights”).
129. Hall, supra note 115, at 264.
130. Id. (“The white system under apartheid didn’t recognize communal land,
because it was a form of customary law. However, the Communal Property Act created a
formal framework that gave communal property rights to a legal entity called a Communal Property Association, which then registered the property”).
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This right was strengthened by the 1996 Interim Protection of Informal
Land Rights Act, which protected individuals with communal land interests
(as opposed to the community).131 Under that system, individuals with
communal land claims could not be deprived of their land rights without
consent.132
C.

Land Redistribution

The goal of the land redistribution program was to provide black
South Africans with access to agricultural land.133 Redistribution was one
of the initial goals of the land reform program because it was seen as being
maximally able to promote socioeconomic justice and economic development for the black community.134 Unlike the land tenure and land restitution programs, blacks benefiting from redistribution had no former claim
to land and had to qualify for state grants to purchase land.135 This program would help most in the long term by resolving land, housing, and
poverty problems, as well as by creating equality.136
Similar to what it did with land restitution, however, the government
decided to adopt a “willing-buyer, willing-seller” approach, which allowed
whites to inflate prices and slowed down the process because the State was
the only purchaser.137 In an attempt to fix this issue, the government
announced a plan of expropriation of prices if price settlements became
stagnant after six-months.138 These complications have led to widespread
disappointment at the slow pace of the redistribution process.139 As of
2005, the government had transferred less than 4% of white-owned farmland back to black ownership.140
South Africa’s current goal of increasing redistribution in rural lands
is primarily to avoid a domestic uprising and land-grabbing situation com131. See Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (S. Afr.), available
at http://www.lawsofsouthafrica.up.ac.za/index.php/browse/land/interim-protectionof-informal-land-rights-act-31-of-1996/act/31-of-1996-interim-protection-of-informalland-rights-act-26-june-1996-27-september-1998-pdf/download.
132. See id.
133. See RDLR, supra note 125, at 23.
134. See Chang, supra note 13, at 636.
135. See id.
136. See id. (describing other comparable initiatives to promote similar goals).
137. See DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS, TOWARD THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE REVIEWING OF
THE WILLING BUYER WILLING SELLER PRINCIPLE 15– 17 (Sept. 17, 2006), available at http://
www.caxtonmags.co.za/data/files/doc/file_f51f2d1898758ed8b68157174c3c1d80
.DOC (commenting “it is clear that the prices of land in the open market have been
escalating and continue to do so because Government cannot walk away from the
negotiations”).
138. See Fair price for land reform, BRAND SOUTH AFRICA (Dec. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.southafrica.info/doing_business/economy/fiscal_policies/landreform-policy.htm; see also Farmers spooked by ‘expropriation’ threat, supra note 118.
139. See e.g., Pierre De Vos, Willing buyer, willing seller worksFalse if you have a lifetime to wait, CONSTITUTIONALLY SPEAKING (June 13, 2013), available at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/willing-buyer-willing-seller-works-if-you-have-a-lifetime-to-wait/.
140. See Chang, supra note 13, at 637.
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parable to that of Zimbabwe.141 However, this is a risky move for South
Africa. South Africa has 43,000 black and white rural farmers, and if the
country meets the goal of a 30% white-to-black redistribution, thousands
of white commercial farmers will likely be out of business.142 In light of
the situation in Zimbabwe, this could be catastrophic for both the white
farmers and the country’s agricultural industry.143
D.

Zimbabwe: Lessons Learned

The government’s struggle to strike a balance between rectifying the
effects of apartheid and maintaining the goodwill of South Africa’s white
population has resulted in a stagnant and overly complex reform effort.144
Many South Africans fear that, in the absence of speedy, effective progress,
the country will follow Zimbabwe’s example of violent land reform.145
In 2000, Zimbabwe implemented a “land reform program” to institute
a government- sponsored land restitution program.146 This land restitution program was designed to return white-owned farmland to poor, black
Zimbabweans. President Robert Mugabe instituted the program in
response to cultural tensions focused solely on Zimbabwe’s absence of
prior land reform or redistribution.147 A privileged political class executed
the program, which ended up becoming a violent fiasco when the politically elite and unskilled workers repossessed most of the commercial
farms.148 The result was a dramatic decline in the country’s agricultural
141. See id.
142. See Farmers spooked by ‘expropriation’ threat, supra note 118.
143. Today, Zimbabwe is no longer able to produce sufficient food supplies to feed its
country, much less to use farming as a profitable export. See generally Ward Anseeuw,
Tinashe Kapuya & Davies Saruchera, Zimbabwe’s agricultural reconstruction: Present
state, ongoing projects and prospects for reinvestment 9 (Development Bank of Southern
Africa, Working Paper Series No. 32, 2012).
144. Zimbabwe has a similar experience with colonialism to that of South Africa.
Zimbabwe has a history of white rule, similar to the start of apartheid. Ian Smith, a
white colonist, took over Zimbabwe in a brutal fashion that ensured his control, but also
ensured gross resentment among the subjugated black communities. Black Zimbabweans who were not working on designated farms or in urban areas were forced to live on
reserves. See Claxton, supra note 106, at 541.
145. See Anseeuw, Kapuya & Saruchera, supra note 143, at 9 (describing the Fast
Track Land Reform Programme as “a process marked by considerable coercion, violence
and illegal activity, [where] thousands of party-sponsored settlers and veterans of the
Liberation War invaded commercial farms . . .”).
146. See Ryan Dale Groves, Fast-Track Land Reform and the Decline of Zimbabwe’s
Political and Economic Stability 67– 68 (2009) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of
Central Florida in Orlando, Fl.), available at purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/CFE0002801. President Mugabe stated that he would adopt a “fast-track” land reform process in Zimbabwe
where a national committee, the National Land Identification Committee, would identify
tracks of land for redistribution. See also Simon Coldham, The Land Acquisition Act,
1992 of Zimbabwe, JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW 82 (Spring 1993), available at http://www
.jstor.org/stable/745590 (discussing the previous legislation which was supposed to
speed up the land reform process through Land Designation and Compulsory
Acquisition).
147. See Groves, supra note 146, at 67– 68.
148. Some citizens of Zimbabwe fully supported Mugabe’s efforts and have praised
his intervention. See, e.g., Godfrey Marawanyika, Thank you, Mr Mugabe: Zimbabwe’s
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production, leading to food shortages and the destruction of numerous previously profitable commercial farms.149
Zimbabwe then passed the Land Acquisition Act in 1992, which
allowed the government (specifically President Mugabe) to create a Land
Reform program that would facilitate the government’s ability to redistribute and expropriate land.150 Mugabe then tried to pass a referendum that
would allow government expropriation without compensation, but the referendum failed.151 After his referendum failed, Mugabe permitted a group
of war veterans to attack and overtake white farms.152 Today, Zimbabwe’s
Land Acquisition Act serves as the primary example of what not to do in
land reform.153 Furthermore, the act also demonstrates the inadequacy of
a market-based land reform program in societies that require a massive
restructuring of a country’s land and wealth distribution.154
III. South Africa’s Mining Paradigm
South Africa is home to some of the richest mineral resources on the
African continent.155 However, apartheid policies led to the inequitable
distribution of those resources.156 Prior to 1992, the South African government promoted an individual land-ownership policy under the guise
that “successive [South African] governments ha[d] ‘since 1910 pursued
economic policies based on the principles of free enterprise and the market
system.’”157 In reality, under apartheid only white South Africans had the
rights to own land, which effectively limited access to the mineral market
to less than 10% of the total population.”158 The country experienced a
forced land redistribution led to huge controversy – but it has transformed the lives of
thousands of small farmers, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 5, 2013), available at http://www
.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/thank-you-mr-mugabe-zimbabwes-forced-landredistribution-led-to-huge-controversy— but-it-has-transformed-the-lives-of-thousands-ofsmall-farmers-8923229.html.
149. See Groves, supra note 146, at 69 (“Damage caused to Zimbabwe’s infrastructure
and economy was incalculable. Underutilization of farms, unqualified personnel, mass
unemployment, shortages of foreign currency, and severe food shortages compounded
the international isolation, drought, and political upheaval that had defined the past five
years”).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Heather Boyle, The Land Problem: What Does the Future Hold for South
Africa’s Land Reform Program? 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 665, 687 (2001).
155. South Africa hosts the world’s largest reserves of gold, platinum group metals,
chrome and manganese ores, and the second-largest reserves of zirconium, vanadium,
and titanium. Pocket Guide to South Africa 2012/13: MINERAL RESOURCES, available at
http://www.gcis.gov.za/sites/www.gcis.gov.za/files/docs/resourcecentre/pocketguide/
2012/15%20Mineral%20Resources.pdf.
156. See LARP, supra note 2, at 7.
157. Laissez-Fair, supra note 14, at 167 (quoting White Paper on the Mineral Policy of
the Republic of South Africa: Para 1.8). On 1 January 1992, the 1991 Minerals Act came
into effect and South Africa was regulated by a combination of common law and legislation. See id.
158. See DEPARTMENT OF MINERALS AND ENERGY, supra note 16.
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dramatic shift in 2004 when the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 came into effect and essentially nationalized the mining process.159
A.

History of South Africa’s Mining Rights

Three common forms of mineral ownership exist in government-coordinated mining systems.160 The first model is state ownership where the
government holds property rights to all mineral resources “on behalf of the
people[.]”161 The second method is the “lease or ‘regalien’ system” which
most countries currently utilize.162 Under that system, the state holds all
permanent mineral rights and miners both apply to and pay the state for
tenured rights to mine specific minerals.163 The third method grants the
owner of the land surface corresponding rights “to hold, extract, or dispose
of the [underlying] minerals.”164 Under that system, prospectors have the
right to obtain private mineral rights by discovering minerals and registering a claim.165
For the majority of the apartheid era, South African common law followed the third model, where landowners also owned any minerals that
existed below the surface.166 Mineral rights holders could exploit the minerals on the land in addition to assigning or transferring their mineral
rights for value.167 However, The Group Areas Act of 1950, which limited
black access to urban areas, applied to all land ownership and effectively
159. See Peter Leon, Creeping Expropriation of Mining Investments: an African Perspective, 27 JERL 597, 2 (Nov. 2009). Subsequent legislation has continued to ensure mining regulation operates to facilitate the discovery and development of South Africa’s
mineral resources, while ensuring that the government conducts the investigation into
future mineral resources in a sustainable and economically beneficial manner. Tumai
Murombo, ‘Regulating Mining in South Africa and Zimbabwe: Communities, the Environment and Perpetual Exploitation’ [hereinafter Regulating Mining in South Africa], 9/1 L.
ENVIR. & DEV. J. 31, 43 (2013) available at http://www.1ead-journal.org/content/13031
.pdf (citing Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002).
160. See Muna Ndulo, Mining Legislation and Mineral Development in Zambia, 19 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 13– 15 (1986).
161. Id. at 13 (citing Mines and Minerals Act, ch. 329 of the Laws of Zambia (as
amended by No. 32 of 1976) Section 3(1) (Zambia is one of the countries following the
State-ownership model, with its President holding the property right to all minerals
within its boundaries.).
162. Id. at 14.
163. See id. “The miner’s tenure is seldom equivalent to a fee title, but is rather a
bundle of rights and obligations, the composition of which varies greatly from country
to country.”
164. Id.
165. See id. at 15.
166. See Laissez-Fair, supra note 14, at 16 (“This ‘mineral right holding,’ in terms of
the various mining laws and common law, g[ave] the landowner special rights either to
mine or, where statutorily required, to obtain the necessary mining title” (citing Blen
Lloyd Stuart Franklin & Morris Kaplan, The Mining and Minerals Laws of South Africa 7
(1982) and Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967 Section 7(2)(a), 25(2))).
167. Landowners could be the holders of the mineral rights, or, where rights were
severed, an individual could hold title specifically to the mineral rights. See Agri South
Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 26.
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precluded blacks both from acquiring land or mineral rights.168
In South Africa’s apartheid-era mineral program, the government
issued claims and mining leases to interested prospectors.169 These prospectors were white individuals who had made mineral discoveries or could
trace legitimate ownership.170 The government granted mining leases for
the excavation of deep-level mines to any applicant perceived as being able
to promote the government’s goals.171 Blacks were excluded from that
opportunity by Section 7 of the Group Areas Act as well as Section 25(3) of
the Mining Rights Act, which stated that “no lease shall be granted unless
the Minister is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
precious metals occur in workable quantities.”172 Since the Mining Rights
Act prevented blacks from owning land and holding prospecting licenses,
whites exclusively held these mining leases.173 The effect of the mining
laws was to effectively prevent non-whites from “acquiring and exploiting
any significant mineral deposits of any nature in South Africa,” and “has
limited their participation in the mining industry to that of labourers.”174
The effects of the restrictive mining regime were very similar to the
effects of the restrictive land ownership laws.175 Under apartheid, the government forced blacks to accept the transfer of land and mineral rights to
white prospectors.176 However, once the demise of apartheid led to
changes in the laws that lifted the restrictions, black South Africans supported the redistribution of those mineral rights and the accompanying
wealth.177 Empowered by the newly drafted constitution, lobbying move168. See id. at 25. While the government could grant an exception if there was a
compelling reason to grant a black individual ownership rights, this occurrence was
extremely rare. This legislation effectively precluded blacks from benefitting from South
Africa’s extensive mineral wealth.
169. See Badenhorst, P.J., Exodus of ‘mineral rights’ from the South African Mineral
Law, 22 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 218, 222 (2004).
170. See Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at
38. “The Act provides that a claim license may be obtained by ‘any natural person of the
age of eighteen years or upwards . . . ‘ but goes on to state that no claim license shall be
issued ‘to a coloured person, except in respect of state land situated in the Province of
Cape of Good Hope or land which the ownership vests in a coloured person or an association of coloured persons or a corporate body or company in which coloured persons
hold a controlling interest; to a black, except in respect of land which the South African
Development Trust or a black is the owner or which is held in trust for a black. Group
Areas Act Section 49(2)(b) (1950).
171. See Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at
38.
172. Id. at 11.
173. See id. at 70.
174. Id. at 3.
175. See Yazini April, An Analysis of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development
Act 28 of 2002, and the Nationalisation of Minerals Debate in South Africa, 42 AFRICA
INSIGHT 115, 117 (2012) (“The structure of mineral law in South Africa has always been
complicated, and heavily influenced by the racial injustices of apartheid.”).
176. See id. at 118 (“Many black-owned communities who lived on mineral-rich land
did not even have the basic claim to minerals since they could not be owners of the land
under apartheid, which can be evidenced through the Land Act 27 of 1913 and the Trust
and Land Act 18 of 1936, which deprived blacks of land wealth”).
177. See ANC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 17, at 115. See also Cohen, supra note 21.
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ments emerged to ensure that a united South Africa would benefit from the
country’s mineral wealth.178
B.

South Africa’s Current Mining System

Until 2004, holders of mineral rights had the right to use their minerals as they wished.179 These rights included exploiting the minerals on
their land and assigning or transferring the mineral rights for value under
the Minerals Act of 1991.180 Following the third model of mineral ownership (where landowners also owned any minerals that existed below the
surface), the mineral rights were tangible rights of indefinite duration.
These rights did not require the holder to exercise the rights via mining in
order to maintain them.181 The government only got involved if the rights
holders needed authorization to prospect or mine under the Minerals
Act.182 Depending on the minerals in question, officials would issue the
necessary authorization and then there was no further mechanism for government control.183 Specifically, “common law rights to minerals were not
subject to termination by a public authority for non-compliance with the
Minerals Act or on any other grounds.”184
The mining system changed in 2002 when Parliament passed the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (“MPRDA”).185 The
MPRDA effectively:
[Froze] the ability to sell, lease or cede unused old order rights until they
were converted into prospecting or mining rights with the written consent of
the Minister for Minerals and Energy (Minister). It also had the deliberate
and immediate effect of abolishing the entitlement to sterili[z]e mineral
rights, otherwise known as the entitlement not to sell or exploit minerals.186

Mineral rights holders were furious because the legislation removed their
ability to sell, lease, cede, and prospect minerals, thus dramatically altering
178. See Frik Els, Anglo-American lobbying flops as clamour intensifies for nationalization of South Africa’s mines, MINING.COM (June, 19, 2011), available at http://www.mining.com/anglo-american-lobbying-flops-as-clamour-intensifies-for-nationalization-ofsouth-africas-mines/ (commenting on “growing calls in South Africa for majority government ownership of key industries and a push for a greater role for the state in the
economy”).
179. Holders of mineral rights could be either the owner of the surface (where the
mineral rights had not been severed from the land) or a successor in title to the surface
owner.
180. See Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenberg Platinum Mines Ltd 1996 (4) SA
499 (A) at 509 and 528I– 529B.
181. See Ex parte Marchini 1964 (1) SA 147 (T) at 150– 51.
182. See Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 35
(“[T]he control by the state under [the Minerals Act] was a system whereby the exercise
of mineral rights was controlled through permits, authorizations, licenses and permissions which created a framework within which common-law mineral rights as elements
or derivatives of ownership of land, could be exercised”).
183. See Minerals Act, §§ 9(3), 9(5), and 39.
184. Leon, supra note 159, at 11.
185. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002.
186. See Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at
39.
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the rights that they had previously held.187 The government effectively
removed the previous owners’ abilities to use minerals or the rights without
more explicit authorization. This restriction was designed to prevent the
exploitation of minerals by eliminating an owner’s mineral rights to determine the amount and pace of their mining.188
While many of the mineral rights holders lobbied against this legislation and filed expropriation suits, the government stood its ground.189
The government defended this change because the MPRDA gives effect to
Section 25(4)(a) of the South African Constitution.190 Section 25 “requires
that reform measures be implemented to bring about equitable access to all
South Africa’s natural resources.”191 The democratic South African government introduced this mineral rights policy in order to enable equitable,
race-blind access to South Africa’s mineral wealth by implementing “a system of state custodianship of mineral resources ‘for the benefit of all.’”192
Under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002,
Section 3(2) states that:
“As the custodian of the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources, the state,
acting through the Minister, may (a) grant, issue, refuse, control, administer and manage any reconnaissance
permission, prospecting right, permission to remove, mining right, mining
permit, retention permit, technical co-operation permit, reconnaissance permit, exploration right and production right; and
(b) in consultation with the Minister of Finance, determine and levy, any
fee or consideration payable in terms of any relevant Act of Parliament.193

The implementation of the MPRDA changed the mechanism of
resource ownership and created a one-year term for exchanging mineral
rights, at the end of which any remaining “old order rights” would
expire.194 With the State as custodian, mineral resource owners were
deprived of the basic right of control that they previously enjoyed.195 Legal
critics have complained that “[t]he Act essentially replaced the principles of
private law, based on rights of ownership, with principles of administrative
law based on conditional state licenses.”196 Regardless of the conflicting
views, the implementation of the MPRDA has correlated with diminishing
187. See id. at 50.
188. See id. at 50.
189. See April, supra 178, at 119 (“The Act essentially replaced the principles of private law, based on rights of ownership with principles of administrative law based on
conditional state licenses. In this regard, the MPRDA provided the initial impetus for the
encroachment on the ownership rights of mining investors.”).
190. See S. AFR. CONST., § 25(4)(a) of 1996.
191. Leon, supra note 159, at 12.
192. See DEPARTMENT OF MINERALS AND ENERGY, supra note 16, at para. 1.3.1.2.
193. Id.
194. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, 94– 95.
195. See Peter Leon, A Fork in the Investor-State Road: South Africa’s New Mineral Regulatory Regime Four Years On, 42(4) J. OF WORLD TRADE 671, 679 (2008).
196. Leon, supra note 159, at 12.
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values of mineral rights in South Africa.197
Despite the depreciation in the value of mineral rights, the MPRDA
serves a valuable function.198 Today the government monitors all mineral
claims.199 Private companies and individuals still have the ability to mine
resources, but the government taxes companies separately for prospecting,
mining, and removing minerals from the land.200 This multiple taxation
system accomplished many objectives.201 First, the taxes significantly
increased the government’s profit from domestic mining operations.202
Second, the government was able to intentionally regulate mineral extraction and mining across the country.203 Third, this regulation enabled the
government to preserve mineral deposits and prevent mining
monopolies.204
IV. Implementing a Mining Framework on Land Ownership
A.

The Rationale

Apartheid created tensions in South Africa’s mining industry that
were similar to the tensions that the farming industries currently face.205
Until the 1990s, whites held almost complete title to the country’s mineral
and mining rights with nearly no restrictions on the way those rights could
be exercised.206 The development of South Africa since apartheid has led
to industry-wide reforms that have partially nationalized the mining industry and enabled the government to implement a system that meets the goals
of efficiency, mineral conservation, and equal access to mineral
197. See id.
198. See April, supra 175, at 125 (“According to the South African parliament report,
key activities of this regulation programme would include monitoring and enforcing
compliance, inspections of social and labour plans, mining and prospecting work
programmes, and environmental management plans”).
199. See id. at 120.
200. See Leon, supra note 159, at 12, 23.
201. See Elmarie van der Schyff, South African mineral law: A historical overview of the
State’s regulatory power regarding the exploitation of minerals, 64 NEW CONTREE 131, 131
(July 2012) (“In 2009 mining contributed 8.8% directly and 10% indirectly to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), sustained approximately one million jobs and created roughly R10.5 billion in corporate tax receipts”).
202. See generally Graham Glenday, South African Tax Performance: Some Perspectives
and International Comparisons, Tax Symposium 2008, National Treasury of South Africa
(Mar. 26, 2008), available at https://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/826.
203. See generally Avril Cole, Mine regulations changing in South Africa, THE INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE JOURNAL (Jan. 11, 2014) available at http://www.internationalresource
journal.com/features/january11_features/mine_regulations_changing_in_south_africa
.html.
204. See DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, MINERAL REGULATION (2011) available at http://www.dmr.gov.za/mineral-regulation.html
(describing a function of the Mineral Regulation Branch as “[a]ddress[ing] past legacies
with regard to derelict and ownerless mines and enforce legislation regarding mine rehabilitation by means of regulated environmental management plans”).
205. See Laissez-Fair, supra note 14, at 172.
206. See THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, TWENTY YEAR REVIEW:
SOUTH AFRICA 1994 – 2014 87 (2014), available at www.20yearsoffreedom.org.za/20Year
Review.pdf.
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resources.207
Today, South Africa’s mining reforms serve as an example to other
mining countries of what is possible.208 South Africa has the advantage of
its constitution, its strong government, and its judicial infrastructure that
allow it to enforce a decision.209 The country has been able to demonstrate the possibilities of success for a nationally regulated mining system.210 This presents numerous possibilities for other countries struggling
with foreign control over a majority of domestic natural resources.211
Given Africa’s history of colonization, most countries suffer from foreign
mineral ownership in some regard.212
More importantly, South Africa’s success in mineral reform is directly
applicable to the government’s struggle with land distribution.213 Given
the many interests involved in land reform— from critics interested in providing small farms to poor blacks to those interested in funding urban
migration— the reality is that South Africa’s poor black population has a
plethora of pressing needs.214 Any land reform policy geared solely toward
increasing available rural land will run the risk of ignoring the issues that
are truly important in the urban and most volatile areas of South Africa,
Johannesburg and Cape Town.215
B.

The Framework

Similar to the apartheid government’s land ownership regulations,
mining regulations prior to the 1990s systematically excluded non-white
South Africans from the opportunity to own or be involved in the country’s
mineral wealth except in the capacity of menial laborers.216 Once the democratically elected government began implementing the new Constitution
207. See id. at 3.
208. See Franklyn Lisk, Hany Besada & Philip Martin, Regulating Extraction in the
Global South: Towards a Framework For Accountability 30 (High Level Panel on the Post2015 Development Agenda, Background Research Paper, May 2012) (“At the policy
level, a coordinated and integrated global value chain approach to mineral resource
development is necessary [for sustainable mineral reform]”).
209. See supra notes 5-7 (describing South Africa’s rights-based constitution).
210. See Thomas Walde, Mining Law Reform in South Africa, 17(4) MINERALS &
ENERGY 10, 17 (2002). There is great risk involved in South Africa’s mining efforts,
including “the risk that a well-functioning industry might be destroyed and go down the
same path as many other African countries (except Botswana). There is also a benefit,
namely that the South African minim industry will no longer be seen to symbolize economic apartheid, but will be an engine of prosperity for all South Africans.”).
211. See id. at 11.
212. See generally Gareth Austin, African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies,
THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF GENEVA INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2010), available at http://poldev.revues.org/78 (discussing how colonial rule and African actions
during the colonial period affected the resources and institutional settings for subsequent economic development south of the Sahara).
213. The struggle and debate between entrenched mineral right holders are comparable to those of the farmers and white landowners who currently hold states as a result of
the apartheid regime.
214. See Laissez-Fair, supra note 14, at 172.
215. See id.
216. See Leon, supra note 195, at 679.
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in 1994, the government justly re-defined the mineral-ownership paradigm
in order to expand access to South Africa’s non-white majority.217 This
process did not involve taking property from the white owners and giving it
to the black citizens.218 Instead, the government nationalized the rights
and created a taxation structure to facilitate services, which benefited the
whole country and the communities impacted by mining.219 Although the
owners of old-order mining rights have brought suits based on expropriation, the country has benefited as a whole from the departure of its previous private-ownership model.220 Furthermore, the previous rights holders
are not forbidden from mining and further capitalizing on their rights.221
Rather, the nature of their ownership has changed.222
The South African government must take a similar course of action in
the realm of land ownership. The country’s three-tiered effort to remedy
unequal land distribution experienced great success initially; however, that
success has plateaued and is no longer addressing the needs of South African citizens.223 This is largely due to the fact that beliefs about the country’s political history influence political conversations around land reform
and complicate changes that would further the country’s economic and
political well-being.224 Furthermore, the romanticized image of impoverished South Africans receiving farms and rural land as a method of extricating themselves from poverty should not be the government’s primary
concern.225 In reality, there are a much more pressing issues towards
which South Africa should concentrate its resources, namely creating
employment and housing opportunities for black South Africans in urban
areas.
217. See Leon, supra note 195, at 679.
218. See Gavin Capps, A bourgeois reform with social justice? The contradictions of the
Minerals Development Bill and black economic empowerment in the South African platinum
mining industry, REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 315, 316 (2012). Statements of
the ANC leadership made it clear that expropriation of the mines was “off the political
agenda . . . Rather, the state’s influence within the mining industry would be ‘confined
to orderly regulation and the encouragement of equal opportunities for all citizens in
mineral development”).
219. See DEPARTMENT OF MINERALS AND ENERGY, supra note 16, at para. 1.3.1.2; see also
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, Section 3.
220. See DEPARTMENT OF MINERALS AND ENERGY, supra note 16, at para. 1.3.1.2; see also
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, Section 3.
221. See Capps, supra note 218, at 316. While “older order” rights were abolished in
favor of new “universal rights,” it would be expected that mining companies would continue mining operations. The purpose of the act was to disseminate those rights in a
manner that was centralized, eliminating entrenchment in the mining industry. This
was designed to open the door to black miners.
222. See id.
223. See Atuahene, supra note 4.
224. See id.
225. See Keith Bryer, Most land claimants do not want to be farmers, BUSINESS REPORT
(Aug. 20, 2014, 8:00 A.M.), available at http://www.iol.co.za/business/opinion/columnists/most-land-claimants-do-not-want-to-be-farmers-1.1737902#.VFsSb_mAGGQ
(“Today, most South Africans live in cities. Most of us, black and white, do not wish to
farm. Above all, none of us relish the harsh life that ‘peasant farming’ inflicts”).
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Under a land-taxation regime (which mirrors South Africa’s mineraltaxation regime), the South African government would implement a progressive taxation program. This program would impact all landowners,
regardless of race, wealth, or socioeconomic background. The taxation
scheme would depend on land size and land use. Certain types of land
use— commercial farmlands, tribal farmlands, grazing land, barren land,
etc.— would merit different initial tax brackets. Depending on the bracket,
there would be a threshold hectareage226 under which land would not be
taxed.227 Any land above that amount would be taxed annually based on
quantity of surface area owned.
Suppose a landowner has 50 hectares and they surpass the initial tax
bracket threshold. If there is a 1.75% land tax for parcels less than 50
hectares but a 5% land tax for parcels between 50 and 100 hectares, the
land owner would then be taxed at 5%. The government would set the
specific tax brackets according to the type of land ownership the government is interested in promoting. For example, 100 hectares might be the
most profitable size for a profitable commercial farm, whereas 25 hectares
might be the most efficient size for a private grazing parcel. The land
owner would then have the option to adjust their ownership to minimize
their tax burden, or, alternatively, they would be able to maintain their
current ownership but pay taxes in a way that adds to the operational efficiency of the country.
This system will allow current landowners a finite period of time (ideally the one-year time frame allocated for mineral rights) during which they
could register the titles and use of their land. The government could then
continue adjusting the various importance levels of different land uses and
apply taxes accordingly. For example, tribal lands or land being utilized by
rural villages could be exempt from any taxation. Low-income farms might
also be exempt or put into a very low tax bracket. On the other hand,
commercial farms and game reserves could be put into graduated tax systems depending on the size of the area and on the services for which the
land is being utilized. The country would be able to provide additional
resources and put more funds into purchasing land for land restitution programs if the government implemented a registration scheme similar to the
model used for land rights.228 If any type of land use became more important to the country, the taxation scheme could be adjusted.229
C.

The Benefits

The effect of this tax scheme will be to tailor land use to the government’s needs. The country will be able to provide additional resources and
226. Land in South Africa is measured according to hectares, as opposed to acres.
227. For example, land would not be taxed if the minimum hectarage for commercial
farming were ten hectares.
228. See Atuahene, supra note 4 (commenting that South Africa’s Land Restitution
Commission lacked adequate funding to complete its land distribution goals).
229. This mirrors South Africa’s ability to adjust its mineral taxation depending on
which mines are more lucrative and in higher demand.
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put more funds into purchasing land for land restitution programs.230
Additionally, implementing a registration scheme that is similar to the
model used for mineral rights will allow citizens and the government to
track land reform progress more closely.231 At the same time, white landowners who hold tens of thousands of hectares of land, could choose to
keep that land at a burdensome tax rate to maintain the registration on
their lands. This will meet multiple government objectives.
First, this taxation system will allow the government to obtain land
needed for the restitution program. A scheme that was incrementally
increased should incentivize landowners to choose to own a specific
amount of land right below one of the tax thresholds. Any forfeited land
could then be used to settle more of the land claims that are still in flux.
Second, this taxation system will provide the government with an
influx of income. Land is a unique commodity that owners tend to be
reluctant to sell, even when it makes financial sense. For that reason, even
a burdensome tax scheme will be unlikely to impact all landowners in the
same manner. The funds paid from the tax could be used toward pressing
urban concerns, the creation of more housing developments, or the provision of government job opportunities and public services. The funds could
then be used to purchase land to further help with the restitution and tenure prongs of the current land program.
Third, a graduated tax rate will affect all landowners and will therefore
be deemed race neutral. Although the majority of South Africa’s land and
mineral rights are currently held by white South Africans due to the Native
Land Act of 1913, the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, and the Group
Areas Act of 1950, today there is a possibility of emerging black landownership.232 Under this proposed land taxation scheme all substantial farms
will be equally impacted, providing the South African government with
greater legitimacy and increasing the likelihood of black land ownership.
Conclusion
Today, South Africa is a thriving democratic nation with the potential
to be a model of a successful transition from colonized country to independent democracy. In order for the country to meet those goals, the government must continue to address the material racial inequalities that still
plague South Africa. This requires South Africa to develop a land distribu230. See Glenday, supra note 202, at 6 (“South Africa charges a number of taxes on
property— estate duty and donations tax, transfer duty and marketable securities tax—
which in combination collect about 0.6% of GDP or just over 2% of revenues”). Adding
a graduated taxation scheme to the existing taxation scheme would ensure increased
revenues.
231. See generally SOUTHERN AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGY, THE RISE
OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM: A RESURGENCE OF STATE CONTROL IN AN ERA OF FREE MARKETS
OR THE LEGITIMATE SEARCH FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM? (2012). Given South Africa’s relatively low sovereign debt and credible fiscal and monetary track record, increased
nationalization will lead to a shift in company investment, monitoring, and the speed
and intensity of government feedback on corporate behavior.
232. See supra Part 1.A.1.
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tion system that continues the progress that the country has been able to
make in rectifying the land grabbing that occurred under the apartheid
regime. This proposed land taxation system should provide South Africans
from the homesteads with the ability to migrate to urban areas. The alternative is to risk a potential internal conflict similar to what occurred in
Zimbabwe.
In order to achieve the successful transition from a colonial land ownership model to a system that provides the possibility of land ownership to
black South Africans, the South African government should follow the successful model set by its mining industry. The industry was able to avoid
racial tension and drama stemming from South Africa’s history by creating
a mineral reform system that avoided racial distinctions.233
Implementing the mining industry model would allow the government
to take an active role in land management, while incentivizing current land
owners to either own smaller plots or choose to pay an increased tax burden depending on their land use. These changes would strengthen South
Africa’s long-term economic security by giving the government greater land
and tax resources. Furthermore, this course of action would provide the
government with the resources necessary to increase efforts to provide
housing and jobs for urban migration— the real needs of South Africa’s
poorest populations.

233. See DEPARTMENT OF MINERALS AND ENERGY, supra note 16, at para. 1.3.1.2; see also
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, Section 3.
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